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THE MINNESOTA ACADEMY OF SCIENCE 
ANTHROPOLOGY 
THE HISTORY OF POLICY IN THE ZANDE SCHEME 
CONRAD C. REINING 
University of Minnesota, Minneapolis 
The Zande Scheme was a bold and unique development scheme 
started in 1945 in Zande District of the southern Sudan as a pilot 
project for the social and economic advancement of the populations 
of the remote regions of Africa. I wish here to trace the history of the 
policy behind the scheme, beginning with the original proposals, not-
ing the changes in those proposals, and the gradual shift in orientation 
of the scheme from a philanthropic to a profit-making venture and 
finally, I seek to account for replacement of the original ideals with 
commercial principles. 
Since the reconquest of the Sudan in 1898, the southern Negro 
provinces had been kept separate from the northern Arabic provinces 
and a policy had been followed for the protection of the population, 
resulting in a relatively undeveloped economic state, even by African 
standards. There had not been full agreement on the so-called "South-
ern Policy" and in the 1920's cotton had been introduced as a govern-
ment cash crop on a small scale into Equatoria Province. Cotton 
was not a popular crop and results were good only when direct com-
pulsion was employed. Cotton was regarded by both administration 
and people as a crop which merely allowed the men to pay their 
taxes. (Catford, 1953). 
Dr. J. D. Tothill, the author of the scheme, was hired by the Sudan 
Government in 1938 as the Director of the Department of Agricul-
ture, with the specific mission of initiating the development of the 
southern Sudan. He had been Director of Agriculture in Uganda and 
closely associated with the development of cotton as a successful cash 
crop there. 
After a preliminary survey of the southern provinces in 1939, Dr. 
Tothill stated that cotton would be the most profitable crop for Zande 
District because it seemed to compare favorably with good cotton 
growing areas in Uganda. He did not believe the road distance of 300 
miles to a river port to be an insuperable factor, nor did he consider 
the previous unpopularity and poor production of cotton in the prov-
ince to be worthy of concern. He wrote that although cotton was a 
proved crop agriculturally in parts of the province, it had never de-
veloped commercially for these reasons: a. poor prices, b. the arous-
ing of suspicions by the forcing and regimentation of the crop, c. the 
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necessity for siting ginneries before the proving of the crop in particu-
lar areas, d. the reduction of marketability by poor ginning, and e. 
cultivation of a variety shorter and harsher in staple than competing 
types. Of these, he assigned the greatest importance to the effects of 
the past price level, for this had been far below that paid in Uganda. 
As the war was drawing to a close in 1943, he submitted a new 
proposal entitled "An Experiment in the Social Emergence of Indige-
nous Races in Remote Regions" and assigned it the goal of "the com-
plete social emergence and the social and economic stability of the 
Zande people." (Tothill, 1948, p. 916). He recommended that some 
remote, relatively large and well-populated area be chosen for a 30 
year trial. Zande District of Equatoria Province, with its 40,000 tax-
payers and its geographical remoteness seemed to him to be emi-
nently well suited for the experiment. A primary reason for this 
choice was the relatively favorable agricultural climate and the pres-
ence of some good soil, (H. Ferguson in Tothill, 1948, p. 918) im-
plying reliable food production with little danger of famine, a factor 
not to be ignored in many other parts of the southern Sudan. Also, 
the Zande people ( Azande) were considered to be industrious and 
amenable to organization. (Ferguson, 1954). 
Dr. Tothill, in unfolding his plan for the experiment, stressed the 
need for education. He stated that the educational system should be 
gradually improved so that 95 percent of the Azande would be literate 
in 30 years time, for he felt the scheme was unlikely td succeed with-
out universal education. The start was to be at the bush level, with 
education available for every Zande boy and girl, and he hoped for 
secondary schools in the area and even, eventually, a university for 
the South. He believed that Khartoum area to be a likely one in which 
to sell the surplus goods from the scheme, which were to be cotton 
cloth, burlap sacks, soap and coffee. The most important of these, by 
far, was to be cotton cloth, for he hoped for a production large enough 
to clothe the 170,000 Azande and, in addition, to earn most of the 
money to pay for imports and the interest on the government loan for 
building factories. Dr. Tothill proposed that parts of Zande District be 
designated to cultivate cotton, oil palms, coffee and jute. In the cotton 
growing area he planned that each family should cultivate one acre of 
cotton in rotation with the usual food crops. He estimated that 10,000 
families could produce about 6,000,000 pounds of seed (unginned) 
cotton annually. 
Dr. Tothill further recommended the erection in Zimde District of 
a modern ginnery and a spinning and weaving mill which were to be 
small units capable of expansion. He believed that a few mill-hands 
imported from Egypt, India or the United Kingdom could, with time 
and patience, teach the Zande people the work in the factories. Be-
cause little had been done in Africa to teach natives factory work, 
other officials must have had doubts about his faith in the unpracticed 
Azande. He admitted that he had little to go on, other than his ob-
servations that many Africans take naturally to tailoring with a sew-
ing machine, ,but he could see no "a priori reason why the Zande 
people would not take naturally to the management of spindles." 
7 
THE MINNESOTA ACADEMY OF SCIENCE 
In addition to the four export industries, he believed some indus-
tries would be required for the production of goods to be consumed 
locally in their entirety, such as sugar, bricks, timber, iron and char-
coal. He expected locally produced bricks and timber to be used in the 
construction of houses and factory buildings and hoped that there 
might be an improvement in Zande housing inspired by the use of 
these materials. He wanted to avoid the use of as many imported 
materials as possible, since he hoped to achieve a high degree of self-
sufficiency for remote regions, by manufacturing locally produced raw 
materials into goods to be consumed locally, with only enough exports 
to pay for the bare minimum of necessary imports, such as machin-
ery .1 
Due to illness, Dr. Tothill was not able to draw up further detailed 
plans and in July, 1944, a meeting considered proposals for the Zande 
Scheme drafted by his successor to the Directorship of the Depart-
ment of Agriculture. A number of important changes was subse-
quently made in Dr. Tothill's proposals although the spirit of his work 
continued to be referred to throughout the planning and operation of 
the scheme. His primary point of providing facilities for universal 
education of the Azande within thirty years was turned aside by the 
assumption that the proposed general increase in educational facilities 
would provide enough education for the Azande. The actual increase 
in educational facilities during the first ten years of the scheme did not 
suit the Azande, however, nor can it be judged to come near to Dr. 
Tothill's intentions. 
By mid-1945, Dr. Tothill's proposals for several cash crops had 
been simplified into a single crop project. Only cotton survived 
the initial committee meetings on peasant crops. The fibre and sack 
industry was never discussed. After 10 years there were less than 100 
acres of sugar cane and less than 20 acres each of oil palms and 
coffee, all grown as plantation crops. In comparison, Zande cultivation 
of cotton was to exceed 20,000 acres in some seasons. Dr. Tothill's 
emphasis upon a modern gin for the preservation of the cotton was 
countered by the purchase of antiquated machinery which was used 
until 1955 when a modern gin was installed. The more familiar, 
longer-staple cotton was to replace the higher-yielding, short staple 
variety which he had suggested for th.e Azande. · 
Nothing came of his suggestions for "partnership" for Azande or 
for participation of Zande individuals in the administration of the 
scheme. Throughout the first ten years of the scheme, there was no 
deviation from the making of policy and decisions solely by the 
Europeans of the governing board and the district administration. 
The principle of an attractive price to the cultivators in· lieu of 
direct compulsion, which Dr. Tothill held to be vitally important 
throughout his proposals, was largely ignored in practice, as was the 
corollary of keeping prices at favorable levels relative to those in 
adjacent territories. Instead, compulsion was relied upon to produce 
1 Much of this report is based on unpublished material obtained from open administrative 
files in headquarters at Yambio, Nzara, Juba, and Khartoum. The kind permission of the offi-
cials in charge is acknowledged. 
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adequate amounts of cotton. Zande families were required to culti-
vate at least one half acre of cotton as a public service and failure to 
do so was punished by various means, usually by requiring a month's 
service on public works. 
Even with the theme of self-sufficiency, Dr. Tothill had advo-
cated a general improvement of communications and the shortening 
of the line of transport by building a new road northeast to the Nile 
and the development of a new port. This proposal was soon defeated 
on the grounds of economy. 
Early in the planning phases, most of the major points in Tothill's 
proposals had been deleted or modified, including multiple cash crops, 
modern ginning machinery, a favorable level of prices to the cultiva-
tors, a strong educational program, and partnership for the Azande. 
In addition, the policy of self-sufficiency was voted out of the plans 
by an early committee, although this was the theme of Dr. Tothill's 
proposals upon which had been based the idea of industrial develop-
ment of a remote region. The industrial aspects were retained while 
supporting ideas were eliminated, resulting in the establishment of a 
costly industrial experiment in an uneconomic location. The factor of 
remoteness remained in the Zande Scheme, but without the justifica-
tion inherent in Dr. Tothill's proposals. Nor was any compensation for 
the remoteness of Zande District devised by the planners who fol-
lowed Dr. Tothill. 
In June, 1945, the Governor General's Council in Khartoum ap-
proved in principle the modified Zande Scheme and the setting up of 
the Equatoria Projects Board (referred to as the 'board' in this report) 
to administer it. The board consisted of three ex-officio directors: the 
Director of Agriculture and Forests, the Governor of Equatoria 
Province, and the Director of Economics and Trade; three other 
Directors, one from the Department of Agriculture and Forests, one 
from the Finance Department and one from the Board of Economics 
and Trade; and a Secretary to be furnished from the Department of 
Agriculture and Forests. The Chairman was, at first, the Director of 
Agriculture and Forests and, later, the Governor of Equatoria Prov-
ince. 
There were strongly divided opinions about the feasibility of the 
industrial aspect of the scheme and a crisis arose early in 1946, during 
a committee meeting, when the Assistant Financial Secretary stated 
that his office was seriouslx questioning the financial soundness of the 
industrial portion of the · scheme, particularly in light of the threefold 
increased estimates for the cost of machinery. He could not see the 
necessity for the spinning and weaving mill and could not understand 
why it was referred to as the core of the scheme. He pointed out that 
only about 400 people were to be employed in the mill and, further, 
that the price of cotton was then high enough so that Zande cotton 
could be profitably exported as lint. 
Other members of the committee countered with the, opinion that 
the financial aspects of the scheme should not be allowed to override 
the social aims and that the spinning and weaving mill was a central 
feature of the original plan by Dr. Tothill to increase the level of 
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self-sufficiency of the Azande to aid their social emergence. The Gov-
ernor of the province indicated that he would withdraw his approval 
of the scheme if it were to be only a cotton exporting project; he 
pointed out that two such projects for the Azande had been disap-
proved previously. The District Commissioner expressed himself even 
more strongly, contending that the withdrawal of the spinning and 
weaving mill would be a breach of faith." He threatened to resign his 
post if there were changes in policy which would remove the industrial 
aspect from the scheme and thereby produce "a shabby and worthless 
substitute" in the form of a cotton exporting scheme. 
There continued to be fear of inefficient operation of the scheme 
if there should be much deviation from accepted collllllercial prac-
tices. A new member of the board in 194 7 expressed the opinion that 
the scheme had been "launched at a time . rendered wholly unpro-
pitious by world conditions and that the technicians had been allowed 
to rush ahead before the administrative machinery had been manned 
and put in working order." In the next year, another member new to 
the board expressed similar doubts about the bold approach to the 
scheme, saying that too much rush had cost more money than need 
have been spent and that the remedy lay in good management which 
was not possible without "ruthless bookkeeping and auditing." 
Others, particularly the province and district administrative offi-
cials, reacted strongly to what they saw as overly commercial tenden-
cies in the proposals to eliminate the industrial features of the 
scheme and to expand cotton production for export in view of the 
high selling prices and strong action on their part was required to re-
tain the philanthropic direction of the scheme. At the time of the early 
crises, there was already the awareness of factionalism, for the Direc-
tor of the Equatoria Projects Board, in proposing increased cotton pro-
duction, referred to opposing arguments as those of "the administra-
tion," while the District Commissioner allied himself with the "socio-
logical" faction, as opposed, presumably, to the commercial faction. 
The Equatoria Projects Board and its staff tended to become 
autonomous as its policies were opposed and an element of secrecy 
can be noted in its operations. The permanent organization of the 
board in Zande District was staffed largely with former government 
officials, so the orientation of operations differed little from estab-
lished governmental practices and the directors of the board continued 
to be high government officials acting in a commercial capacity for 
the board. Nonetheless, the staff of the board in Zande District insis-
ted on the fiction that it was a commercial concern independent of the 
local administration. This isolation was justified in terms of maintain-
ing business privacy, but it added to the ineffectiveness of communi-
cation between the people and the policy forming agencies which 
characterized the Zande Scheme. The aloofness of the board from 
the locai · affairs added to the suspicion the Azande had about the 
machinations of the scheme, and the commercial bias soon proved to 
be based on inapplicable premises. 
Most of the construction of the factories at the industrial center 
was completed and installation of machinery was begun by the end 
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of 1950. The spinning and weaving mill began to produce edible oil 
from cotton seed early in 1951 and cloth by November, 1951. In 
about six years, despite numerous difficulties, a complex factory had 
been installed where there had been only bush before. 
In the operation of the scheme, as in the planning phase, some 
officials did not agree with the "bold" proposals of Dr. Tothill and 
there was apparent a fear of wasting money and inefficient operation. 
This short range view had little competition, because the longer range 
views of the idealists had so few tangible aspects. The idealists held a 
much weaker position from the start than the commercialists because 
so little of the social aims of the scheme was formulated or, indeed, 
capable of formulation. No one has ever amplified or defined the 
"social emergence" which was the primary aim of the scheme. No 
analysis has been made of the relationship between the economic and 
the social aspects of the scheme, though some officials spoke in terms 
of this dichotomy. No specific suggestion has yet been made concern-
ing the social development of the Azande. In 1955, the money set 
aside for social development five years before was still largely un-
spent, due to a lack of ideas of what to spend it on. The hopes laid 
by .the members of the Zande District Local Advisory Committee 
upon social technicians to implement the social side of the scheme, 
as engineers were implementing the mechanical side, shows the lack 
of insight into the problems of social development. That there is no 
science of social engineering did not enter into the calculations of the 
idealists. 
The commercialists had their way, because their arguments were 
familiar and appeared sound. Before the end of the construction pe-
riod, the board had assumed a commercial basis and had withdrawn 
its ultimate responsibilities to the high level of the government offices 
in Khartoum, cutting off its responsibility to the Azande or identifica-
tion with them. The district and province administration was left to 
defend what remained of the original ideals. The passage of time, 
with frequent replacement of personnel, helped to efface the major 
objective of the scheme. Original ideals were replaced by aims which 
had become quite short in range and the scheme from the official side 
eventually was composed of a number of specific tasks and positions. 
This was particularly true of the board which seemed to consider its 
main objective to be the keeping of its own books in order and in the 
black. The financial success of the first years, due to the high price of 
exported cotton and the willingness of the Azande to produce large 
amounts of cotton, allowed a false sense of the validity of these ar-
rangements. 
The Europeans were aware that they are not paying the Azande 
one one-hundredth as much as they themselves would require to main-
tain interest, but the fact that the Azande were willing to start work-
ing hard supported the belief that the dual standards were sound. In 
the absence of ideas of how to control economic change, the officials 
tended to restrict the ainount of money which the Azande were al-
lowed to earn. The knowledge that the intentions behind the scheme 
were to help the Azande to imorove their lot, gave credence to the 
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policy of paying low prices for the cotton which was exported at large 
profit, in order to pay for the expensive industrial experiment. An 
extraordinary chance was lost to attract the interest of the people 
by the positive incentive of good returns for their cotton, in view of 
the very favorable world cotton market. While the Azande were los-
ing interest in the growing of cotton, due to the feeling that they were 
being deceived, the officials continued to work on the assumption that 
they were following a policy designed to ultimately benefit the Azan-
de, but were guided in making th~ policies for the scheme by stand-
ards for the Azande which neither the Azande nor the Europeans 
would apply to themselves. 
In an effort to clarify the operations of the board, certain business 
principles had been instituted which led to the primacy of solvency 
within the board. It can be seen, in retrospect, that the Azande bore 
these costs out of the money which they could have received for their 
cotton. The low level of rewards resulted in the serious decline in cot-
ton production and the decline in the board's profits. By 1954, the 
board was in dire financial straits, for it had lost money in the previous 
season and an operating loss was predicted for the current season, un-
less cotton production could be increased and there was no assurance 
of that. The Minister of Finance reported to the Council of Ministers 
in Khartoum that the previous years had been extraordinary in allow-
ing large profits on the cotton exported and that governmental sub-
sidies would be necessary in order to keep the board and the Zande 
Scheme operating in the future, even after all possible economies, 
abandoning most of the programme of agricultural development and 
curtailment of the cotton supervision program. The Minister of Fi-
nance commented that the Zande Scheme had not been started as a 
commercial undertaking for the making of profits, but as a social ex-
periment, and that the possibility of profits from high cotton prices 
had perhaps concealed its real purpose. He also indicated that nearly 
half of the government's investment of LE. 1,000,000 in the board's 
activities had been recovered through export duties on cotton and im-
port duties on machinery, stores and goods for sale. He pointed out 
that a projected mill in the northern Sudan was to be subsidized from 
the start. All costs in Zande District, except for unskilled labor, were 
higher than they would be at the new mill, yet there had been no sub-
sidies to the mill in Zande District. 
After an excursion for several years into the realm of commercial 
independence and business principles the board was brought back to 
its original purposes. When the profits were no longer available, the 
social theme was brought up again and the position of a small indus-
try in a difficult location was recognized. But the ignoring of the Zan-
de reactions up to that point were to make the situation still worse. 
The results of the following crop in 1955 showed conclusively the 
temper of the Azande, for it was a castastrophically small one, less 
than half the minimum amount needed to keep the board going at the 
proposed level of subsidies. The uprisings which followed interrupted 
my observations and further disturbed the operations of the scheme. 
That the frankly imperialistic cotton projects of the Belgian Congo 
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should have proved to be more generous in the judgment of the Azan-
de must be viewed as high irony, as must the deterioration of the 
scheme, which was inspired solely by altruism, into what seemed to 
the people to be gross exploitation. 
This brief history shows that problems in the planning of techno-
logical development are not confined to inter-cultural situations; we 
need to investigate our own various motivations for sponsoring de-
velopment. Also, this history clearly demonstrates once more that the 
best of intentions are no insurance -of furthering the welfare of a pop-
ulation undergoing directed change. In fact, ideals can often obscure 
the need for ideas. Long range ideals, unsupported by specific knowl-
edge can lead to the emergency employment of principles which are 
not consistent with original aims. The presentation of both the Euro-
pean side of the Zande Scheme, as in this paper, and the Zande side 
in work elsewhere can contribute to the solution of some of the prob-
lems inherent in technological development in underdeveloped areas. 
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